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Abstract 
The proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) has resulted in a heterogeneous regime of 
trade rules applicable among WTO Members. The interplay between PTA and WTO rules has several 
implications, including risks of legal tensions and incoherence between both regimes, as well as 
between overlapping networks of PTAs. Consequently, adjudicative bodies both under regional PTAs 
and global WTO dispute settlement mechanisms are increasingly confronted with taking account of 
alien legal sources for the purpose of interpretation. Coherence between PTA and WTO rules thus 
depends on the degree to which adjudication at both levels – PTA and WTO – allows integration of 
alien legal sources. This paper explores the role of systemic integration as a method of interpretation 
under public international law allowing adjudicating bodies to deal with possible tensions and promote 
coherence within international trade law. It traces the various approaches to systemic integration 
pertaining to international trade rules as employed under both WTO and PTA adjudication. While 
systemic integration offers a public international law tool for reducing fragmentation of substantial 
law, there is heterogeneity in adjudicative practice regarding the readiness to employ systemic 
integration for the purpose of interpretation. The article identifies possible avenues through which 
future dispute settlement could exploit the potential for coherence through systemic integration, as 
well as elements which could be taken into consideration when integrating multilateral and 
preferential rules. It also provides insight on how PTAs could facilitate the application of systemic 
integration by adjudicating bodies at both levels.  
Keywords 
International trade; dispute settlement; regional agreements; interpretation; coherence 
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I. Introduction* 
The impasse in the WTO Doha negotiations has resulted in PTAs achieving trade opening relatively 
quickly compared to the WTO.
1
 More than 500 PTAs have been concluded and several more are in the 
pipeline, including some mega-regionals, such as the plurilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
Agreement,
2
 the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In terms of variable geometry, PTAs have been the 
most popular avenue through which groups of Members sharing similar interests have pursued further 
trade liberalization and other objectives.
3
 
The interplay between PTA and WTO rules has several implications, including risks of legal 
tensions and incoherence between both regimes, as well as between overlapping networks of PTAs. 
The extensive coverage of some recent PTAs, which ranges from customs matters to investment 
protection and environment or labor standards, exacerbates the complexities of the PTA-WTO 
relationship. There are undesired systemic effects of the coexistence of PTAs and global WTO rules, 
including a fragmentation in international trade law.
4
 
There are several ways of dealing with frictions due to overlapping networks of global and regional 
trade rules. One is setting rules at the global level. However, negotiations to clarify and improve the 
multilateral rules on PTAs have remained deadlocked for several years and have dealt mainly with 
traditional market access issues. They seem now unsuitable to deal with the new generation of PTAs 
and the complex WTO-PTA relationship. While the transparency of PTAs has increased notably in 
recent years, there is no political control over PTAs at the multilateral level.  
A more realistic avenue towards achieving coherence, particularly in the short or medium term, is 
through adjudication – both on the level of PTAs and WTO. Considering adjudication as an instrument 
for ensuring coherence highlights the relevance of legal techniques applied by adjudicating bodies to 
mitigate the undesired systemic effects of PTAs and to reduce fragmentation in international trade law. 
In this vein, this article seeks to identify the methods of interpretation under international law which 
may be used to deal with possible tensions and promote coherence between PTAs and WTO rules, as 
                                                     
*
 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They do not represent the views of the WTO or its Members, 
nor its Secretariat. 
1
 On this widely discussed phenomenon, see, inter alia, Simon Lestern and Bryan Mercurio (eds), Bilateral and Regional 
Trade Agreements: Commentary and analysis, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Simon Lester, 
Bryan Mercurio and Lorand Bartels (eds), Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements: Case studies, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015); Thomas Cottier and Panagiotis Delimatsis (eds), The Prospects of International 
Trade Regulation: From Fragmentation to Coherence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Jean-Pierre 
Chauffour and Jean-Christophe Maur (eds), Preferential Trade Agreements Policies for Development World Bank: A 
Handbook (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2011); Richard Baldwin and Patrick Low (eds), Multilateralizing 
Regionalism, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, WTO (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009); David A. Gantz, Regional Trade Agreements: Law, Policy and Practice (2009); Joseph H. H. Weiler (ed), The 
EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000).  
2
 The TPP was signed on February 4, 2016. It has not entered into force yet. 
3
 For a behavioural law and economics explanation of this phenomenon, see Armin Steinbach, ‘The Trend Toward Non-
consensualism in Public International Law: A (Behavioural) Law and Economics Perspective’, 27 EJIL 643 (2016), at 
654. 
4
 Pamela Apaza Lanyi and Armin Steinbach, ‘Limiting jurisdictional fragmentation in international trade disputes’, 5 
Journal of International Dispute Settlement 372–405 (2014); Gabrielle Marceau, ‘Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of 
Jurisdictions: The Relationship between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties’, 35 Journal of World Trade 
1081 (2001), at 1108; and Lowe Vaughan, ‘Overlapping Jurisdictions in International Tribunals’, 42 Australian Year 
Book of International Law 191–204 (1999). 
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well as between overlapping networks of PTAs. On a number of occasions, the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) had to deal with questions concerning the bearing of PTAs on WTO rules in the context 
of WTO dispute settlement. A recent example is Peru - Agricultural Products, where the Appellate 
Body examined the scope for using a PTA that had been concluded among the disputing parties for 
purposes of interpretation.
5
 Likewise, dispute settlement mechanisms (DSM) installed under PTAs 
have looked on a number of occasions into WTO provisions or case law for the purpose of interpreting 
provisions under PTAs.
6
 
More specifically, this article examines the scope provided under the principle of systemic 
integration embodied in Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna 
Convention), which offers a legal basis for promoting coherence of legal acts emanating from different 
legal orders in public international law.
7
 In particular, PTAs could be taken into account, in certain 
circumstances, as part of the relevant normative environment in WTO disputes among the preferential 
partners through, for example, WTO open-ended, generic, or evolving terms. Conversely, the WTO 
agreements, including WTO decisions such as the Doha Declaration, and rulings adopted by the DSB, 
could provide valuable guidance in PTA disputes as a means of ensuring coherence between WTO and 
PTA rules, as well as between overlapping networks of PTAs, while preserving the WTO acquis. 
Against this background, this article is structured as follows: Part II explores the scope of systemic 
integration pertaining to the integration of PTAs into WTO law. Different approaches are examined as 
to how Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention can be applied for that purpose. We demonstrate the 
scope for systemic integration by reference to "public morals" under the WTO general exceptions, 
which offers a concrete example of how to use PTAs in ascertaining the meaning of undefined terms 
or open-ended terms. Part III discusses existing and possible avenues for integrating WTO law in PTA 
disputes. Part IV concludes. 
                                                     
5
 Appellate Body Report, Peru - Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products (Peru - Agricultural 
Products), WT/DS457/AB/R and Add.1, adopted July 2015; see also Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting 
Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil - Retreaded Tyres), WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted December 2007; Appellate Body 
Report, Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products (Turkey - Textiles), WT/DS34/AB/R, 
adopted November 2009; Panel Report, Argentina - Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil (Argentina - 
Poultry), WT/DS241/R, adopted May 2003. 
6
 See, for instance, NAFTA Chapter 20 Panel Report, Cross-Border Trucking Services (6 February 2001); Panel Report, 
US Safeguard Action taken on Broomcorn Brooms from Mexico (16 January 1998); NAFTA Chapter 20 Arbitral Panel, 
US - Agricultural Products, Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S. Origin Agricultural Products (2 December 1996); 
Pope and Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, Ad hoc Investment Tribunal (UNCITRAL) (November 2002), at 
http://www.biicl.org/files/3922_2002_pope_&_talbot_v_canada.pdf. See also Hsu Locknie, ‘Applicability of WTO Law 
in Regional Trade Agreements: Identifying the Links’, in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino (eds), Regional Trade 
Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 525–552; Ignacio García Bercero, 
‘Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements’, in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino (eds), Regional 
Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 400–401; David A. Gantz, 
‘Dispute Settlement under the NAFTA and the WTO: Choice of Forum Opportunities and Risks for the NAFTA Parties’, 
14 American University International Law Review 1025 (1999). 
7
 On the use of Article 31 Vienna Convention for the purposes of integrating WTO law and other treaties, see Benn 
McGrady, Trade and Public Health: The WTO, Tobacco, Alcohol and Diet (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2011); Pieter Jan Kuijper, ‘Conflicting Rules and Clashing Courts: The Case of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 
Free Trade Agreements and the WTO’, ICTSD Issue Paper No. 10 (2010), at 6–8; Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty 
Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Marceau, above n 4, at 1108–1131. 
For a more general text on the principle of systemic integration, see Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic 
Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’, 54 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 279–314 
(2005). 
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II. Integrating PTAs in WTO law: Instruments under international law 
International law stipulates a presumption against conflicts between treaty provisions.
8
 It is widely 
accepted that norms bearing on a same issue should, to the extent possible, be interpreted consistently 
with each other. The presumption against conflict is based on the principles of good faith and pacta 
sunt servanda.
9
 There is an assumption that, unless an intention to the contrary is clear, treaties 
emanating from states must be interpreted as being intended to produce effects in accordance with 
existing law.
10
 It has been stated that the presumption against conflict is especially reinforced in cases 
where separate agreements are concluded between the same parties, since they can be presumed to be 
consistent with each other in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.
11
 The presumption against 
conflict has been applied in a number of WTO disputes.
12
  
A. General Rules of Interpretation 
Accordingly, in the case of tension, PTAs and WTO rules shall, to the extent possible, be interpreted 
as giving rise to compatible obligations. Interpretation is the process of clarifying the meaning and 
scope of a treaty norm.
13
 The purpose of interpretation is to ascertain the meaning of a term that is, for 
instance, ambiguous, generic, or “open-ended.” However, the interpretation of treaties cannot 
"modify" the meaning of the term or go beyond what is expressed by the parties. Interpretation may 
not go against the meaning of the terms of the treaty rule that is being interpreted (interpretation 
contra legem);
14
 in other words, it cannot displace or override the applicable law.
15
 Article 3.2 of the 
DSU provides for the clarification of the provisions in the WTO covered agreements in accordance 
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law, which include Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention. The main rules on treaty interpretation are embodied in Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention.
16
 The status of these rules as reflecting customary international law has been 
confirmed by WTO adjudicating bodies in a number of disputes.
17  
                                                     
8
 See Wilfred Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’, 30 The British Year Book of International Law 401, 427–429 
(1953). Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 237–268. International Law Commission, 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission (ILC Report on Fragmentation), April 2006, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.682, at paras 25–28. 
9
 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention.  
10
 Case concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Preliminary Objections, 1957 ICJ Rep. 
142. See ILC Report on Fragmentation, above n 8, at para 39. 
11
 Marceau, above n 4, at 1084. See also E. W. Vierdag, ‘The Time of Conclusion of a Multilateral Treaty: Article 30 of the 
Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties and Related Provisions’, 59 BYIL 100 (1988).  
12
 For instance, see Appellate Body Report, Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (Canada - Periodicals), 
WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted 30 July 1997, 19 paras 219–222; Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for 
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, 
para 167; and Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (Indonesia - Autos), 
WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, adopted 23 July 1998, para. 14.28. 
13
 Request for Interpretation of the Judgement of 20th November 1950, Asylum Case, 1950 ICJ Rep. 240 (November 27). 
14
 Pauwelyn, above n 8, at 237–268.  
15
 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Separate Opinion Judge Higgins (Merits), 2003 ICJ 
Rep. para 49. 
16
 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Merits, 1994 ICJ Rep. 21–22; and Gabcikovo–Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary v. Slovakia), Merits, 1997 ICJ Rep. 38. See also Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, 16–17. 
17
 See, for instance, Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US–
Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996; Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan–Alcoholic Beverages 
II), Appellate Body Report, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996.  
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Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention states that a treaty shall be interpreted “in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in the context of the treaty and in the 
light of its object and purpose” (emphasis added). This first paragraph informs the rest of Article 31 
and serves as a guide to the process of treaty interpretation.
18
 The principle of good faith applies to the 
entire process of interpretation
19
 and requires the terms of a treaty to be interpreted in the context of 
the whole treaty, including its preamble and annexes.
20
 The context would also include any footnotes 
and, arguably, side letters signed by the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty. The 
latter is relevant as the footnotes, annexes, and side letters of some PTAs include important guidance 
for the interpretation of PTA and WTO rules.
21
  
Article 31.3 provides that, together with the context, the following shall be taken into account 
(emphasis added):  
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions; 
(b) Any subsequent practice between the parties in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties (emphasis 
added). 
Article 31.3(a) and (b) refer to subsequent agreements or practices between the parties regarding the 
interpretation or application of a treaty. Paragraph 3(a) covers interpretative agreements made after the 
conclusion of a treaty. In US- Clove Cigarettes, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that 
paragraph 5.2 of the Doha Ministerial Decision on Implementation-related Issues and Concerns 
constitutes a subsequent agreement between the parties within the meaning of paragraph 3(a).
22
 The 
Appellate Body stated that a decision adopted by Members may qualify as a "subsequent agreement 
between the parties" if: (i) the decision is, in a temporal sense, adopted subsequent to the relevant 
covered agreement; and (ii) the terms and content of the decision express an agreement between 
Members on the interpretation or application of WTO law.
23
 Another decision which could qualify as 
a subsequent agreement between the parties would be arguably the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health
24
. .  
                                                     
18
 As noted by the ILC, jurists differ to some extent in their basic approach to the interpretation of treaties according to the 
weight which they give to the text of the treaty, the intentions of the parties, and the object and purpose of the treaty. See 
International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries’, 2 Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission 218 (1966). In Japan - Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body stated that “the proper 
interpretation of the Article is, first of all, a textual interpretation”, Appellate Body Report, Japan - Alcoholic Beverages 
II, above n 16, 19. 
19
 This implies that, when states conclude an agreement, they take into account all their other international obligations, 
including general principles, customs, and treaty obligations. See Marceau, above n 4, at 1081–1131. 
20
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), Article 31.2. See also Ian Sinclair, The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) 128. 
21
 The US PTAs, in particular, include some clauses that are relevant for determining the relationship between the PTAs 
and WTO Agreement in side letters and annexes. 
22
 The Appellate Body stated that the Doha Ministerial Decision constitutes a subsequent agreement between the parties on 
the interpretation of the term "reasonable interval" in Article 2.12 of the TBT Agreement. Appellate Body Report, United 
States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012. 
23
 US-Clove Cigarettes, Appellate Body Report, para 241-75. 
24
 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted on 14 November 2001. In this decision, Members 
affirm that the TRIPS Agreement "can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of Members' 
right to protect public health" and promote access to medicines. 
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In turn, paragraph 3(b) captures any subsequent practice between the parties concerning the 
interpretation of a treaty. A ‘practice’ is a sequence of facts or acts and cannot in general be 
established by one isolated fact or act or even by several individual acts or pronouncements. What is 
required for the purpose of Article 31(3)(b) is that the subsequent practice be concordant, common, 
and consistent.
25
 The judicial practice of WTO adjudicators confirms so. The Appellate Body in US – 
Gambling clarified that the test for determining the existence of ‘subsequent practice’ comprises two 
aspects: (i) there must be a common, consistent, discernible pattern of acts or pronouncements; and (ii) 
those acts or pronouncements must imply agreement on the interpretation of the relevant provision.
26
 
As regard the first element, the Appellate Body in EC-Chicken Cuts stated that for a particular practice 
to qualify as "common" and "concordant" it does not necessarily need to be exercised by all parties to 
a treaty. Yet, it would be difficult to establish a practice on the basis of acts or pronouncements of only 
one or very few parties.
27
 In EC – Computer Equipment, in the context of using tariff classification 
practice as a supplementary means of interpretation, the Appellate Body stated that to establish the 
common intention of the parties to the treaty, the prior practice of only one of the parties may be 
relevant, but it was clearly of more limited value than the practice of all parties.
28
 As mentioned above, 
the Appellate Body in US-Gambling stated that, in addition to determining the existence of a common, 
consistent discernible pattern of acts or pronouncements, one must demonstrate that such acts or 
pronouncements "imply agreement on the interpretation of the relevant provision".
29
 The issue of 
whether PTAs could be used as evidence of “subsequent practice” in connection with the 
interpretation of WTO rules has been suggested by some commentators in relation to the use of certain 
PTA provisions and "templates" with standard PTA provisions.
30  
While sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) relate to events taking place after a treaty's conclusion, (c) does 
not contain any such time indication, which seems to suggest that the latter covers both rules of 
international law at the time of conclusion of the treaty and at the time the interpretation is being 
made.
31
 Also, the scope of Article 31.3(c) is broader, as it refers to any relevant rules of international 
law applicable to the relations between the parties. Article 31.3(c) constitutes an expression of the 
“principle of systemic integration”, which seeks to ensure that international obligations are interpreted 
                                                     
25
 Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Panos Merkouris, ‘Canons of Treaty Interpretation’, in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias 
and Panos Merkouris (eds), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 153-238, at 223.  
26
 US-Gambling, Appellate Body Report, para. 192-3.  
27
 Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts (EC-
Chicken Cuts), adopted on 27 September 2005, para. 259.  
28
 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment (EC- 
Computer Equipment), WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, adopted 22 June 1998, para. 93.  
29
 United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, US-Gambling, 
Appellate Body Report, DS285, adopted on 20 April 2005, para. 192-3. The Panel in EU-IT Products, when considering 
the classification practice of the EU and other Members, stated that it would be for a party asserting the existence of a 
common and concordant practice among WTO Members to provide sufficient evidence – which clearly is something 
beyond a handful of classification exercises in one Member- to establish such a "consistent, common and concordant" 
classification practice. Panel Reports, European Communities and its member States – Tariff Treatment of Certain 
Information Technology Products, WT/DS375/R / WT/DS376/R / WT/DS377/R, adopted 21 September 2010 (para. 
7.565). 
30
 See, for instance, Mitchell A. and Voon T., Preferential Trade Agreements and Public International Law, in: Simon 
Lester and Bryan Mercurio (eds.), Bilateral and Regional trade agreements, p.81–113; and, Voon, Tania, Eliminating 
Trade Remedies from the WTO: Lessons from Regional Trade Agreements, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 
2010, Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 625–667; Locknie Hsu, 'Applicability of WTO Law in Regional Trade Agreements: Identifying 
the links', in Lorand Bartel and Federico Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO legal system, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 525-552.  
31
 Don W. Greig, Intertemporality and the Law of Treaties (London: British Institute of International & Comparative Law, 
2001) 46.  
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by their normative environment;
32
 that is, not only in their own context, but in the wider context of 
international law.
33
 Article 31.3(c) has been interpreted to serve, inter alia, to resolving conflicting 
obligations arising under different treaties.
34
 It has been stated that Article 31.3(c) is a concrete 
expression of the presumption against conflict and harmonization, since good faith requires states to 
regard their treaty rights and obligations as an integrated whole.
35
  
B. Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention 
Under Article 31.3(c), two conditions have to be met. First, the rule must be “relevant” and must also 
be “applicable in the relations between the parties”. The “relevance” of the international rule for 
purposes of Article 31.3(c) shall be assessed in relation to the treaty term or provision that is subject to 
interpretation. As Judge Higgins stated, Article 31.3(c) could not envisage incorporating the entire 
substance of international law on a topic not mentioned in a particular clause.
36
 Thus, a rule would be 
“relevant” if it concerns the subject matter of the provision at issue.37 In EC and certain member States 
– Large Civil Aircraft, the Appellate Body defined the term “relevant” similarly.38  
Second, the rule has to be "applicable in the relations between the parties". There is disagreement 
concerning its scope ratione personae; that is, whether the term “parties” alludes to all the parties to 
the treaty or could cover only a sub-set of parties. There is no doubt that Article 31.3(c) comprises 
norms of general international law applicable to all states, such as customary international law and the 
general principles of international law.
39
 For instance, the Appellate Body has stated that certain 
provisions of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (ILC Articles) constitute "customary rules 
of international law" (CIL). Insofar as the ILC Articles reflect CIL, they would be "applicable in the 
relations between the parties"
40
 leading the Appellate Body to apply a "provision-by-provision" 
approach to consider whether the ILC Articles concerned constitute CIL mainly based on decisions by 
international courts and prior statements made by the respondent recognizing the ILC Article as CIL.
41
 
The latter would suggest that, while it is not necessary for a party to show that it has persistently 
objected to the CIL during its formation, it is still required to show that such party has acknowledged 
the CIL character of a provision before using it for the interpretation of WTO provisions.  
The WTO adjudicators have resorted to the ILC Articles to interpret WTO rules. In US–Anti-
dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), for example, the Appellate Body took into account 
certain provisions of the ILC Articles to interpret WTO rules pursuant to Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna 
                                                     
32
 ILC Report on Fragmentation, above n 8, at para 423. 
33
 Sinclair, above n 19, 139. 
34
 Richard K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008) 260. 
35
 See Kuijper, above n 7, at 6–8. 
36
 See Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Separate Opinion Judge Higgins (Merits), 2003 
ICJ Rep. para 49.  
37
 Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 
433.  
38
 Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft (EC and Certain Member States - Large Civil Aircraft), WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted June 1, 2011, para 846. 
39
 See ILC Report on Fragmentation, above n 8, at paras 424–428. 
40
 Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute (US – 
Continued Suspension), WT/DS320/AB/R, adopted 14 November 2008, para.382.  
41
 Appellate Body Report, US-Line Pipe, para. 259. See also Graham Cook, Digest of World Trade Organization 
jurisprudence on public international law concepts and principles, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 363. 
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Convention.
42
 While considering Article 5 of the ILC Articles, it concluded that since the outcome of 
its analysis did not turn on such provision, it was not necessary "to resolve definitely the question of to 
what extent Article 5 of the ILC Articles reflects customary international law".
43
 More recently, in 
Peru – Agricultural Products, the Appellate Body was requested to take into consideration Articles 20 
and 45 of the ILC Articles for the interpretation of the WTO agreements. The Appellate Body 
ultimately concluded that the PTA provision and the ILC Articles were not "relevant" to the 
interpretation of the WTO provisions at issue.
44
 The approach used in that dispute would constitute an 
indirect way of integrating PTAs as their rules would be considered through the ILC Articles, which 
would be used for the interpretation of WTO rules. This avenue will be explored below by reference to 
indirect integration of PTAs. By contrast, the issue here is whether other international treaties can be 
used for purposes of interpretation and, if so, whether they have to be binding on all the parties to the 
treaty that is being interpreted, or only on some of them. The question of whether PTAs can be 
considered for interpreting WTO rules is directly linked to these questions (direct integration of 
PTAs).  
As mentioned above, Article 3.2 of the DSU provides for the clarification of the provisions in the 
WTO covered agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law, which include Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. The use of external treaties was first 
addressed in a GATT dispute, US–Tuna, where the Panel rejected the use of certain environmental 
Conventions (such as CITES
45
) and other bilateral and plurilateral agreements for purposes of 
interpretation.
46
 In the WTO context, the Panel in EC–Biotech Products interpreted that Article 31.3(c) 
refers to all parties to the treaty that is being interpreted; that is, to all WTO Members.
47
 The narrow 
interpretation in EC–Biotech would imply that only international rules that are binding on all the 
Members can be used to interpret WTO rules, which automatically excludes PTAs from being used for 
WTO interpretation.  
Against this background, one can identify three main possible interpretations under Article 
31.3(c).
48
 It may cover any rules of international law binding on: (i) all the parties to the treaty under 
interpretation; that is, all WTO Members (narrow approach); (ii) a sub-set of WTO Members, 
including both parties to the dispute (inter-partes approach); or, (iii) a sub-set of Members, where both 
parties to the dispute are not parties to the treaty used for interpretation (broad approach). Under the 
narrow approach, it would simply not be possible to use PTAs to interpret the WTO Agreement. The 
inter-partes approach would admit the use of PTAs in WTO disputes among the preferential parties 
only. The broad approach would allow for the use of PTAs in disputes among a PTA partner and a 
WTO Member (non-PTA party). While the Appellate Body referred to this issue in Peru-Agricultural 
Products, it stated that it was not addressing the meaning of the term "parties" in Article 31.3(c).
49
  
                                                     
42
 The Appellate Body held that, even when the WTO has its own rules on the matter (which constitute lex specialis), those 
Articles could be used for purposes of interpretation. Appellate Body Report, US - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (China), DS379/R/AB, adopted March 2011, paras. 311- 313. 
43
 US- Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), Appellate Body Report, para. 311.  
44
 Peru – Agricultural Products, Appellate Body Report, para.5.118.  
45
 Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, adopted on 3 March 1973, and entered 
in force on 1 July 1975 CITES. 
46
 GATT Panel Report, United States- Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, BISD295/91, 
adopted February 1989, para 4.19. 
47
 Panel Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, (EC - 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products), WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, adopted September 2006, 
para 7.70. 
48
 Benn McGrady uses a similar approach, referring to these three possible interpretations as the “restrictive approach” (all 
parties), “divergent” (rules applicable only to the parties to the dispute), and “broad approach” (rules applicable only to 
one of the parties to the dispute), respectively. McGrady, above n 7, at 45–79. 
49
 See Appellate Body Report, Peru - Agricultural Products, above n 5, para 5.104–5.105. 
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1. Narrow approach: Article 31.3(c) covers all the parties to the treaty under interpretation 
Two main arguments support the narrow interpretation of Article 31.3(c). The first argument is a 
textual one and is based mainly on the “context” of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention and on the 
use of the term “parties” in other Articles of the Convention. That was also the main approach used by 
the Panel in EC–Biotech.50 The second argument relates to the “consent” and requires the external rule 
to reflect the “common intention” of all the parties to the treaty under interpretation. The Panel in EC–
Biotech relied on the use of the term “parties” in Article 31.3(c) as well as on Article 2.1(g), which 
defines the meaning of “party” for purposes of the Vienna Convention.51 This led the Panel to 
conclude that the rules to be taken into account are those that are applicable in the relations between 
“all the parties to the treaty which is being interpreted” (that is, all WTO Members).52 However, such 
interpretation is not compelling, as the lack of qualifications in Article 31.3(c) could also be 
interpreted in the inverse way, that is, as allowing consideration of treaties between a sub-set of the 
Membership (less than all Members), and could also refer to the parties to the dispute.
53
 As to the 
second argument, it has been argued that only treaties reflecting the “common intention of all WTO 
Members”, either by agreement or tolerance, shall be taken into account to interpret WTO rules.54 This 
argument is mainly based on the principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, which states that a 
treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent.
55
  
As pointed out by the ILC Study Group on Fragmentation and some commentators,
56
 the narrow 
approach followed by the Panel in EC–Biotech suffers from a number of problems. First, it would 
reduce the number of potential treaties that could be used for the interpretation of WTO provisions.
57
 
Second, and most importantly, it could lead to inconsistencies and incoherencies between systems of 
laws.
58
 The requirement for a treaty to be binding on all WTO Members would unnecessarily limit the 
scope of Article 31.3(c) to a few international treaties of global nature, thereby rendering such 
provision nearly ineffective. It would also imply the introduction of a two-tier system of international 
treaty law: only universal treaties would enjoy the effect of being considered for the purpose of 
interpretation of other treaties, while non-universal treaties would not have this effect. This divergence 
in effect, however, weighs against the notion of equality by introducing a hierarchy among 
international treaties. Furthermore, it would create a paradox whereby the WTO would become more 
isolated from international law as the WTO Membership grows, since fewer international agreements 
would match its membership.
59
 This situation would go against the principle of systemic integration. 
                                                     
50
 Panel Report, EC - Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, above n 47, para 7.68–7.10.  
51
 Article 2.1(g) of the Vienna Convention defines the meaning of the term “party” as “a State which has consented to be 
bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force”. 
52
 Panel Report, EC - Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, above n 47, para 7.68. 
53
 David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law’, 92 AJIL 398 (1998). Article 31.3 
(a) and (b) make no reference to all the parties, although these sub-paragraphs link any subsequent agreement/practice to 
the treaty under interpretation.  
54
 Pauwelyn, above n 8, at 258. 
55
 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention.  
56
 See, for instance, Gabrielle Marceau, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement System and Human Rights’, 13 EJIL 753 (2002), at 754–
814; Robert Howse and Ruti G. Teitel, ‘Beyond the Divide: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political 
Rights and the World Trade Organization’, in Sarah Joseph, David Kinley and Jeff Waincymer (eds), The World Trade 
Organization and Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009) 39, at 44; Joe 
McMahon and Margaret Young, ‘The WTO’s use of Relevant Rules of International Law: An Analysis of the Biotech 
Case’, 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 907 (2007), at 907; Andrew Lang, World Trade Law After 
Neoliberalism: Re-imagining the Global Economic Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 152–153. 
57
 See also McLachlan, above n 7, at 279–314; and ILC Report on Fragmentation, above n 8, at para 471.  
58
 Marceau, above n 56, at 780–783. See also ILC Report on Fragmentation, above n 8, at para 471. 
59
 It has also been stated that since the WTO allows non-sovereign members under certain conditions to become WTO 
Members, it would be impossible for the WTO to have an identical membership to any treaty. Marceau, above n 56, at 
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There is no doubt that the object of an interpretative exercise, as confirmed by the Appellate Body 
in Peru - Agricultural products, is the treaty as a whole. As stated by the Appellate Body in that case, 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is aimed at establishing the ordinary meaning of treaty terms 
reflecting "the common intention of the parties to the treaty" (and not just the intentions of some of the 
parties).
60
 The latter does not mean that only treaties binding on all the Members shall be considered, 
as there may be treaties which, while not binding on all Members, could serve to elucidate the 
meaning of WTO terms or concepts. It is one thing to say that interpretation cannot create either rights 
or obligations" to the Members (add to or diminish the rights and obligations under the covered 
agreements); it is another thing to say that a given interpretation "cannot affect" the Members. Some 
commentators have pointed out that, in fact, any interpretation necessarily "affects" the rights and 
obligations of WTO Members; but this should be read to mean as referring to those Members that are 
"parties to the dispute". In EC- Chicken Cuts, the Appellate Body stated that "the ordinary meaning of 
a treaty term must be ascertained according to the particular circumstances of each case". As stated by 
the Appellate Body in Peru-Agricultural products, "(w)hile an interpretation of the treaty may in 
practice apply to the parties to a dispute, it must serve to establish the common intention of the parties 
to the treaty being interpreted."
61
 While the objective of treaty interpretation is to elucidate "the 
common intention of the parties" (arguably some bilateral and particularly plurilateral agreements may 
serve this purpose); it does not mean that each and every interpretation developed within the context of 
a particular dispute will necessarily in practice affect other Members, as it may in practice apply only 
to the parties to the dispute.  
As mentioned earlier, there are certain limits to treaty interpretation. Particularly, interpretation 
cannot "modify" the meaning of the term or go against the meaning of the terms of the treaty rule that 
is being interpreted (interpretation contra legem). In Peru - Agricultural products, the Appellate Body 
noted that Peru had not yet ratified the FTA, and therefore it was not clear whether it can be 
considered as a "party" to the PTA in the sense of Article 31.3(c). It also noted that even under the 
PTA itself, there is ambiguity as to whether the PTA allows Peru to maintain a WTO-inconsistent 
measure.
62
 The Appellate Body arrived to this conclusion after having looked at a number of PTA 
provisions including those touching upon the relationship between WTO and PTA rules.
63
 While the 
presumption against conflict would require interpreting PTA and WTO rules as giving rise to 
compatible obligations; it was not possible to conclude, from reading the PTA, that the parties had 
agreed on something different from what they had already did in the WTO. Besides, the Appellate 
Body noted that Peru had argued before the Panel that by virtue of the PTA both countries had 
"modified" reciprocally their rights and obligations. Therefore, in view of the Appellate Body, the 
arguments put forward were beyond the scope of an interpretative exercise.
64
 The Appellate Body 
further noted that, if the argument was indeed "modification", then the appropriate avenue for 
assessing whether the parties can modify their WTO obligations would be the regional exception. 
There is no reason to assume that any external treaty used for the interpretation of WTO rules will 
necessarily affect the rights or obligations of other Members that are non-parties to the treaty. 
Therefore, nothing excludes a priori any possibility of taking into account external international rules 
that, although not binding on all Members, may be relevant for the interpretation of WTO rules. The 
narrow approach seems to be the weakest amongst the three possible interpretations, both from a 
technical point of view, as it finds no support in the context of the Vienna Convention, and from the 
(Contd.)                                                                  
781. According to Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, customs unions possessing full 
autonomy of their commercial external relations may become Members of the WTO. 
60
 Appellate Body Report, Peru - Agricultural Products, above n 5, para 5.95. 
61
 Ibid, para 5.95. 
62
 Ibid, para 5.108 and 5.109. 
63
 Ibid, paras. 5.86 and 5.109. 
64
 Ibid. para. 5.96.  
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point of view of systemic integration. The narrow approach would exclude any possibility of 
considering PTAs that may be relevant for the interpretation of WTO obligations, thereby reducing the 
potential of using the principle of systemic integration for promoting coherence between both regimes.  
2. Inter-partes approach: Article 31.3(c) covers treaties among a sub-set of Members, including both 
parties to the dispute 
As stated by the ILC, the use of “relevant rules” within the meaning of Article 31.3(c) is particularly 
relevant where parties to the treaty under interpretation are also parties to the international treaty taken 
into account for purposes of interpretation.
65
 The rationale would be to view states as identical to 
themselves when acting in other institutional and normative contexts.
66
  
On some occasions, WTO adjudicating bodies have considered bilateral agreements amongst the 
parties, even if not formally under Article 31.3(c). The issue is whether treaties among a small sub-set 
of Members, such as PTAs, could be used under certain circumstances when interpreting the WTO 
Agreements, without affecting the rights and obligations of other Members. Some commentators have 
argued that only those treaties that were accepted widely enough should be taken into account.
67
 
Others have stated that international rules found in regional treaties, such as NAFTA or the EU 
Treaties, can be of direct interest and guidance for the interpretation of WTO provisions, to the extent 
that such provisions may be evidence of specific international relevance.
68
 In US–FSC (Article 21.5- 
EC), the Appellate Body looked at several regional agreements for the interpretation of “foreign-
source income” under the SCM Agreement.69 In EC–Poultry, the Panel used a bilateral agreement 
(Oilseed Agreement) between the parties to the dispute (Brazil and the EC) for the interpretation of the 
EU schedule of commitments on goods, which are part of the GATT.
70
 The Panel looked at the 
Oilseed Agreement to the extent relevant for determining the EC’s obligations under the WTO 
Agreement vis-à-vis the complainant (Brazil) only;
71
 that is, not in relation to other Members.  
In EC and certain member States - Large Civil Aircraft, the Appellate Body referred to “other rules 
of international law” under Article 31.3(c). In this dispute, the EU asked the Panel to consider a 
bilateral agreement concluded with the US for the interpretation of “benefit” under Article 1.1(b) of 
the SCM Agreement. Although the bilateral agreement was ultimately not considered because it was 
deemed not “relevant”, the Appellate Body did refer to Article 31.3(c) and the principle of “systemic 
integration” as embodied therein. While reaffirming that the purpose of treaty interpretation is “to 
establish the common intention of the parties to the treaty”, the Appellate Body recognized that in a 
multilateral context, such as the WTO, when recourse is taken to non-WTO rules for the purpose of 
interpreting WTO provisions, a delicate balance must be struck between “taking due account of an 
individual WTO Member’s international obligations and, ensuring a consistent and harmonious 
approach to the interpretation of WTO law among WTO Members”.72 This suggests that it might be 
possible, under certain circumstances, to consider non-WTO law, including bilateral treaties, to clarify 
an individual Member’s obligations under the WTO Agreement. However, it also emphasized a 
                                                     
65
 ILC Report on Fragmentation, above n 8, at para 15. 
66
 Ibid, at para 447. 
67
 Robert Howse, ‘The Use and Abuse of other Relevant Rules of International Law in Treaty Interpretation: Insights from 
WTO Trade/Environment Litigation’, International Law and Justice Working Papers 2007/1 (2007), at 43. 
68
 Marceau, above n 56, at 782. 
69
 Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations (US - FSC, Article 21.5- EC), 
WT/DS108AB/RW, adopted February 2006, para. 144.  
70
 Panel Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products (EC - Poultry), 
WT/DS69/R, adopted March 1998, para 80–84.  
71
 Panel Report, EC - Poultry, above n 70, para 83. 
72
 Appellate Body Report, EC and Certain Member States - Large Civil Aircraft, above n 38, para 845. 
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remaining concern regarding the use of such treaties when interpreting WTO rules; that is, the need to 
ensure a consistent interpretation of WTO rules. 
An argument in favor of considering treaties binding on a sub-set of parties may be that WTO 
rulings have binding effects only on the disputing parties, not all WTO Members (that is, they do not 
amount to stare decisis).
73
 This may suffice for considering PTAs in disputes among the preferential 
parties, where relevant for the purposes of interpreting WTO rules.
74
 Still, some may argue that even 
when such rulings are binding only on the disputing parties, they have a value in terms of precedent.
75
 
While interpretation from prior panels and the Appellate Body do not constitute definitive 
interpretations of the Agreements, they create legitimate expectations among WTO Members and 
traders and should therefore be taken into account in disputes on similar facts or claims.
76
  
The existence of a PTA provision, relevant for the interpretation of WTO terms in a dispute among 
the preferential parties, may constitute a legitimate reason for considering other interpretations without 
compromising the predictability of WTO rulings. The PTA provision would be taken into account for 
purposes of interpretation in the light of the particular circumstances of the dispute. As noted by the 
ILC, the consideration of other rules would simply reflect the need to respect (inherently divergent) 
party will, as elucidated by reference to those other treaties. Thus, a case could be made in favor of 
considering PTA provisions that shed light on WTO terms or provisions in a specific dispute among 
preferential parties, without affecting other Members’ rights or obligations under the WTO 
Agreement.  
In those cases, WTO adjudicating bodies may still need to look at PTA provisions to examine the 
scope provided for systemic integration. Many PTAs include clauses stating that the parties confirm 
their rights and obligations under the WTO Agreements, while some also state that in case of 
inconsistency between the PTA and WTO rules, the PTA shall prevail. As mentioned earlier, in Peru - 
Agricultural Products, the Appellate Body observed that the abovementioned PTA provisions were 
ambiguous and could not necessarily be read as allowing a party to maintain a WTO –inconsistent 
measure.
77
 The latter should be considered by PTA parties when crafting clauses with the aim of 
promoting coherence between both regimes. If the aim of the parties is to agree on something 
different, they should explicitly state so in the PTA. In addition, the PTA parties could explicitly 
provide for the application of the principle of systemic integration amongst them as a means of 
promoting coherence between their international trade obligations or, alternatively, provide that in 
case of possible inconsistency this should be resolved under the PTA.
78
  
                                                     
73
 See Appellate Body Report, Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, above n 7, para 6.10. Among others, in this dispute, the 
Appellate Body held that a “decision” adopted by a panel report is not a “decision” within the meaning of Article 1(b) 
(iv) of the GATT 1994. 
74
 Another argument in favour of taking into consideration PTAs for the interpretation of WTO provisions under Article 
31.3(c) derives from the explicit authorization set forth in the WTO Agreement for inter se modifications aimed at 
furthering liberalizing trade pursuant to Articles XXIV of the GATT (customs unions and free trade areas) and V of the 
GATS (economic integration agreements).  
75
 Such interpretations are commonly used by panels and the Appellate Body in subsequent cases. Thus, the use of rules that 
are only binding on the parties to the dispute could eventually have certain influence in subsequent interpretations. 
76
 On the status of prior panels and Appellate Body reports, see Palmeter and Mavroidis, above n 53, at 400–407. See also 
Appellate Body Report, Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, above n 7, para 6.10–6.18. 
77
 Appellate Body Report, above n 5, para. 5.109. See also footnotes 295, 296 and 297. 
78
 The TPP seems to have adopted this approach. Article 1.2 of the TPP (Relationship to other Agreements) provides that:  
 "1 Recognizing the Parties' intention for this Agreement to coexist with their existing international agreements, each 
Party affirms,  
 a) in relation to existing international agreements to which all Parties are party, including the WTO Agreement, its 
existing rights and obligations with respect to each other; and 
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Assuming that international rules under Article 31.3(c) also cover PTAs, the next question would 
be under what circumstances a PTA provision could be taken into account in a WTO dispute among 
the preferential parties. PTAs incorporate by reference several WTO provisions or borrow WTO terms 
(including some open-ended terms), while clarifying those terms or provisions. In addition, PTAs 
include clauses on the interplay between regional and multilateral rules. Thus, PTA provisions could 
serve different purposes when interpreting the WTO Agreements; for instance, to define the scope of 
certain WTO terms or provisions,
79
 or to clarify the relationship between certain PTA and WTO rules. 
3. Ascertaining the meaning of undefined terms or open-ended terms: The example of "public morals" 
under the WTO general exceptions 
A number of PTAs include a provision on general exceptions which incorporates by reference Article 
XX of the GATT and/or Article XIV GATS into the agreement, making it an integral part of the 
PTA.
80
 Instead, other PTAs include a clause modelled on the WTO exceptions.
81
 Certain PTAs 
provide within the general exceptions that "measures necessary to combat child labour shall be 
deemed to be included within the meaning of measures necessary to protect public morals or measures 
necessary for the protection of health" in accordance with the chapter on social aspects.
82
 The cross-
reference refers to the PTA labor and environmental chapters,
83
 in which the parties reaffirm their 
commitments to internationally recognized core labor standards as defined by the relevant ILO 
Conventions, including "the elimination of the worst forms of child labour". The parties also agree 
"that labour standards should not be used for protectionist trade purposes", and "not to encourage trade 
or foreign direct investment (…) by lowering the level of protection provided by domestic social and 
labour legislation".
84
  
It is argued that the PTA general exceptions clause can be relevant for purposes of defining the 
scope and meaning of "public morals" in the WTO general exceptions. To that end, it may be useful to 
distinguish among the different types of labor provisions found in some PTAs, particularly some 
North-South PTAs, including the TPP. Labor provisions are normally found in separate chapters 
which set forth standards of protection based on the main international treaties. WTO Members have 
different views about the link between trade and labor standards in trade agreements. At the 1996 
WTO Singapore Ministerial Conference, Members renewed their commitment to recognize core 
labour standards, while rejecting the use of such standards as “protectionist tools”.85 With a few 
(Contd.)                                                                  
 b) in relation to existing international agreements to which that Party and at least one other Party are party, its existing 
rights and obligations with respect to such other Party or Parties, as the case may be 
 2.If a Party believes that a provision of this Agreement is inconsistent with a provision of another agreement to which it 
and at least one other Party are party, upon request, the relevant Parties to the other agreement shall consult with a view 
to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. This paragraph is without prejudice to a Party's rights and obligations under 
Chapter 28 (Dispute Settlement)." The agreement provides that the Parties agree that the fact that an agreement provides 
more favourable treatment does not mean that there is an inconsistency within the meaning of paragraph 2.  
79
 See also Isabelle Van Damme, ‘Role of Regional International Law in WTO Agreements’, in Lorand Bartels and 
Federico Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 
553–575. 
80
 See, for instance, Article 29.1 of TPP. Other examples include Article 23.1.1 of US - Chile and US - Korea and Article 
22.1.1 of US - Peru. See also Article 2.15 of EU - Korea and Article 158 of EU - CA. 
81
 See, for example, Article 22 of EU - Mexico, Article 91 of EU - Chile and Articles 158:3 of EU - CA and 106.2 of EU - 
Colombia, Peru. 
82
 See Article 224.1 of the EU - Cariforum. The general exceptions clause applies to trade in goods and trade in services. 
83
 This chapter is in Part II of the PTA titled "trade and trade-related matters". 
84
 See Articles 191.4 and 193 of the EPA. 
85
 They also identified the International Labour Organization (ILO) as the competent body to set and deal with labour 
standards.  
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exceptions,
86
 the WTO Agreements do not include trade-related labor provisions. While WTO rules do 
not set standards of environmental or labor protection, they interact with those policies in several 
ways. Depending on how labor clauses are inserted in PTAs (e.g., setting standards of protection or as 
exceptions), they may interrelate with WTO rules in different ways.
87
 While those other PTA 
provisions may be of some relevance, as in the case at hand given the cross-reference made in the 
PTA, we refer exclusively to the labor clause found in the PTA general exceptions for purposes of 
interpreting Article XX of GATT or Article XIV of GATS. 
As to the interpretation of the WTO general exceptions, a first issue would be whether measures 
aimed at combating child labor or eliminating the worst forms of child labor fall within the range of 
policies designed to protect public morals under Articles XX (a) of GATT and/or XIV (a) of GATS. 
There are two central questions about the meaning of "public morals": what morals are covered and 
whose morals are covered.
88
 The latter touches upon the issue of "territoriality"; that is, whether there 
is an implied jurisdictional limitation in Article XX (a). The PTA clause could be relevant for 
purposes of interpreting the meaning of "public morals" and answering these questions.  
Regarding the first question (what morals), in US - Gambling, the Panel held that open-ended terms 
such as "public morals" can vary from Member to Member, as they are influenced by each Member’s 
prevailing social, cultural, ethical, and religious values.
89
 As stated by the Panel, Members should be 
given some scope to define and apply for themselves the concepts of "public morals" and "public 
order" in their respective territories "according to their own systems and scales of values". 
Subsequently, in this dispute, the Panel examined some dictionary definitions and supplementary 
means of interpretation to delimit the scope of the term public morals.
90
 As to the second question 
(whose morals), in EC—Seals products, the Panel considered that the question of whether a measure 
aims to address public morals relating to a particular concern in the society of a regulating Member 
requires an assessment of two issues: (i) whether the concern in question indeed exists in that society; 
and (ii) whether such concern falls within the scope of "public morals" (standards of right or wrong) as 
defined and applied by a regulating Member "in its territory, according to its own systems and scales 
of values".
91
 On appeal, the Appellate Body referred to this issue, but decided not to examine the 
question further given that the participants did not address it in their appellate submissions.  
As stated by the Appellate Body in Peru - Agricultural Products, if the meaning of treaty terms is 
difficult to discern, determining the ordinary meaning under Article 31 may require more reliance on 
the context and the object and purpose of the treaty and possibly other elements considered "together 
with the context".
92
 A preferential partner applying trade restrictive measures aimed at protecting child 
                                                     
86
 Article XX sub-paragraph e) allows Members to adopt trade-restrictive measures relating to prison labour, subject to the 
requirements of that provision. The preamble to the GATT refers to sustainable development. 
87
 For instance, for the interpretation of Article 2.2 of the WTO TBT Agreement, to the extent the measure is deemed 
covered under such agreement. 
88
 Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Moral Exception in Trade Policy’, 38 Va. J. Int'l L. 689 (1997-1998). 
89
 Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services 
(US - Gambling), WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005, para 6.461; see also Panel Report, China – Measures 
Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, 
WT/DS363/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 January 2010, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS363/AB/R. 
90
 Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling, above n 89, para 6.462–6.474. In this dispute, the Panel turned first to dictionary 
definitions in order to delimit the scope of the term "public morals", and then referred to various examples of 
"supplementary means" of interpretation, some of which involved a moral exception being offered for gambling 
activities, including: international law decisions; examples of WTO Members relying on "public morals" grounds; 
historical examples from past trade negotiations; and judicial rulings in other jurisdictions. 
91
 This analysis was carried out in the context of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities - Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products - AB-2014-1 - AB-2014-2 (EC - 
Seals products), WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R, para 7.379–7.384. 
92
 Appellate Body Report, Peru - Agricultural Products, above n 5, para 5.94. 
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labor could request a WTO panel to take into account the PTA provision in a dispute against the 
preferential party for purposes of clarifying the term “public morals” based on Article 31.3(c) of the 
Vienna Convention as part of "other elements" considered together with the context. The fact that the 
PTA makes explicit reference to child labor within the scope of policies covered by the "moral 
exception" could be given a special weight within this interpretative exercise. The reference to other 
PTA chapters referring to the elimination of the worst forms of child labor and certain ILO 
Conventions may provide additional guidance for purposes of defining the scope of the exception in 
this specific case. The party resorting to the PTA provision as a means of interpretation will need to 
comply with the other requirements under the general exceptions, notably the "necessity test" and the 
chapeau. Regarding the chapeau, as stated by the Appellate Body, the analysis of whether the 
application of a measure results in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination involves an analysis that 
relates primarily to the cause or the rationale of the discrimination.
93
 In other words, it may not be 
possible to justify differential treatment accorded to different Members if the reasons for such 
treatment are not connected to the main objective of the measure. The PTA provision would be taken 
into account as an interpretative tool for purposes of clarifying the meaning of the term "public 
morals" under the WTO general exceptions in order to determine the rights and obligations of the 
parties in the dispute under the WTO covered agreements. 
4. Broad approach: Article 31.3(c) covers treaties among a sub-set of Members which are not binding 
on both disputing parties 
Some may argue that the reference to “any relevant rules applicable in the relations between the 
parties” could also be read to mean any relevant rules of international law applicable to the dispute and 
in the relations between the parties to the treaty under interpretation.
94
 This approach could take into 
account rules of international law that, while not applicable to both disputing parties, are relevant to 
clarify the obligations of one of the parties to the dispute. WTO adjudicating bodies have considered, 
on certain occasions, international rules that were not binding on both parties to the dispute. In US–
Shrimp, the Appellate Body took into account various international treaties that were not binding on 
both parties to the dispute for purposes of interpreting Article XX (g) of GATT.
95
 Also, in US-FSC, 
the Appellate Body took into consideration a number of regional agreements that were not binding on 
the disputing parties for the interpretation of “foreign-source income” under the SCM Agreement.96 As 
mentioned earlier, in EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, the Appellate Body 
seemed to allude to the possibility of taking into account under certain circumstances "individual 
WTO Member's international obligations", while stating the importance of ensuring a consistent and 
harmonious approach to the interpretation of WTO law.  
It may be argued that, under certain circumstances, PTAs could also be taken into account, for the 
interpretation of terms also found in the WTO Agreements, even if those agreements are not binding 
on both disputing parties. A Member may argue, for instance, that a certain provision found in a 
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94
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number of PTAs concluded between WTO Members, which is relevant for the clarification of a WTO 
term, can be used in support of a given general interpretation. Circumstances such as the number of 
PTAs containing the same or similar provisions, the number of parties (e.g., bilateral vs. plurilateral) 
and the composition of the agreements (e.g., PTAs among countries representing different regions and 
legal traditions) can play a role in deciding whether to take into account the PTAs for purposes of 
interpreting WTO provisions or terms.
97
 Ultimately, the "weight" given to the PTA would depend on 
different factors such as the provision at issue, its context, and the circumstances of the particular 
dispute. 
5. Indirect integration of PTAs  
Another possible avenue for integrating PTAs would be through the general rules of international law 
(indirect integration of PTAs).
98
 Under the indirect integration approach, PTAs would be considered 
through the general rules of international law, which would be used for the interpretation of WTO 
rules. While under the approach outlined above, PTAs would be taken into account "as relevant rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties" (direct integration)
99
; under 
indirect integration, PTAs would be considered as a factual matter or as factual evidence. The latter 
approach was used in Peru – Agricultural Products, where the Appellate Body was requested to take 
into consideration Articles 20 and 45 of the ILC Articles for the interpretation of the WTO 
agreements. In this dispute, Peru argued based on Article 20 of the ILC Articles that Guatemala’s 
approval and ratification of their PTA amounted to a “consent” precluding the wrongfulness of 
maintaining the measure at issue.
 100
 The Appellate Body ultimately concluded that the PTA at issue 
and the ILC Articles were not "relevant" as they did not concern the same subject-matter as the WTO 
provisions that were being under interpretation, or as bearing specifically upon the interpretation of 
those provisions.
101
 In this regard, the Appellate Body noted that "in the absence of clarity as to 
whether the PTA rules allow Peru to depart from its WTO obligations, it did not see how the ILC 
Articles that address consent to wrongful acts and consent to a waiver can be relevant to the 
interpretation" of the WTO rules at issue.
102
 This could mean contrario sensu that should the PTA 
provisions had clearly stated that Peru was allowed to depart from its WTO obligations, the ILC 
Articles would have been deemed "relevant"; that is, bearing upon the interpretation of the WTO 
provisions. Some scholars have argued that the Appellate Body’s reasoning in Peru – Agricultural 
Products implies that one may utilize Article 20 not only as a rule to “interpret” WTO law, but also as 
a self-standing defense under general international law from which to justify WTO breaches on a 
bilateral basis.
103
 For this defence to be applicable, it will be necessary to show that Article 20 of the 
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ILC Articles amounts to CIL. As mentioned earlier, the Appellate Body has applied a provision-by-
provision approach to determine whether the ILC Articles constitute customary rules. More 
importantly, relying on Article 20 would require consent to be clearly established
104
 by looking into 
the PTA at issue. This raises again the issue of avoiding ambiguities in PTAs, which turns out to be 
particularly critical when it comes to establishing consent. While WTO adjudicating bodies have 
applied international law principles and CIL to resolve “procedural issues”, they have not used them to 
resolve the “substance” of a dispute.105 For some commentators, the difficulty of applying customary 
rules of international law in reaching a conclusion that a WTO provision has been superseded by 
another international treaty is that panels risk reaching a conclusion that adds or diminishes the rights 
or obligations of WTO Members.
106
 The ILC report on the ILC Articles states that the circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness do not annul or terminate the obligation, which is still binding upon the 
parties; therefore, in principle, the successful invocation of such circumstances as defence would not 
affect or "supersede" WTO obligations.
107
 According to the ILC report, when consent of a number of 
States is required, the consent of one State will not preclude wrongfulness in relation to another.
 108 In 
principle, any other Member that considers itself affected by the measure may start procedures on its 
own merit to request that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with the WTO 
Agreements.  
III. Integrating WTO law in PTA disputes 
Coherence can also be achieved in the opposite direction, that is, when WTO law can inform the 
interpretation of PTAs. In fact, the proliferation of PTAs implies fragmentation of the global trade-
related dispute settlement regime.
109
 In the context of FTAs, most DSMs provide for ad hoc panels 
(not standing bodies, such as the WTO Appellate Body) composed for each dispute. FTAs typically 
contain deeper obligations and provide their own DSMs (modelled on the DSU), which increases the 
likelihood of having more regional disputes in the future. PTAs often incorporate by reference a 
number of WTO provisions. For example, most US PTAs and the latest EU PTAs incorporate, by 
reference, the national treatment principle for trade in goods (Article III of the GATT, sometimes 
including its interpretative notes
110
), as well as the general exceptions (Article XX of the GATT and/or 
Article XIV of GATS
111
), or even in some cases a whole WTO Agreements
112
 (e.g. the TBT 
Agreement
113
). In addition, PTAs commonly borrow definitions or concepts from the WTO 
Agreements, such as the concept of "likeness" or the "necessity test". The level of activity and 
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maturity varies greatly among PTA DSMs depending, for instance, on the level of integration or type 
of agreement (CU or FTA).  
In that context, an issue that arises is to what extent ad hoc PTA adjudicating bodies shall take into 
account WTO law, including WTO decisions adopted by the Membership, and WTO case law as 
adopted by the DSB, when interpreting PTAs. At the regional level, particularly in the case of FTAs, 
there is generally no standing judicial body or mechanism of appeal (similar to the WTO Appellate 
Body). Thus, PTAs rely exclusively on ad hoc panels chosen from a roster of individuals for each 
dispute. WTO interpretations, as adopted by the DSB, can provide valuable guidance for the 
clarification of PTA provisions, as well as predictability for the PTA parties and economic operators. 
What is noteworthy is that some PTAs require adjudicating bodies to consider jurisprudence 
developed by the DSB. For example, the EU–Korea and EU–Central America PTAs expressly state 
that, when interpreting provisions that are identical to WTO provisions, PTA panels shall adopt an 
interpretation “which is consistent with any relevant interpretation established in rulings of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body”.114 The TPP includes a similar provision.115 Other PTAs grant regional 
panels wider powers to consider WTO case law, notably the CETA imposes an obligation on CETA 
panels to take into account relevant WTO jurisprudence without conditioning such obligation on 
particular circumstances.
116
 The requirement for PTA panels to be consistent with WTO 
interpretations results from the recognition of the expertise of WTO adjudicating bodies and the 
importance of keeping coherence with the body of jurisprudence developed at the multilateral level. 
That being said, the clause may result narrow in certain cases where the PTA rule is not identical, but 
still clearly based on WTO rules or terms. 
A first issue is the legal basis under which WTO case law could be used in PTA disputes. It has 
been stated that WTO case law itself, in the form of panel and Appellate Body reports adopted by the 
DSB, does not necessarily constitute rules of international law within the meaning of Article 31.3(c) of 
the Vienna Convention.
117
 While Article 31.3(c) covers all sources of international law, which could 
also include relevant judicial decisions from international bodies, judicial decisions constitute 
“subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law” according to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.118 
Unless the PTA establishes otherwise, WTO interpretations could still be taken into account as 
“subsidiary means of interpretation”. Some PTAs refer to the general rules of interpretation contained 
in the Vienna Convention, while others make no reference to any international rules of interpretation. 
For example, NAFTA provides that the Parties shall interpret and apply the provisions of the 
Agreement in the light of its objectives and “in accordance with applicable rules of international 
law”.119 This has been understood to include Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.120 Most 
post-NAFTA US PTAs do not include an explicit reference to the general rules of interpretation. As 
mentioned earlier, the general rules of interpretation embodied in the Vienna Convention have been 
recognized as general rules of customary international law, which means they are binding on all states, 
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including PTA partners. Thus, even in those cases where the PTAs do not explicitly refer to the 
international rules of interpretation contained in the Vienna Convention, such rules shall be taken into 
account when interpreting the PTAs. The reference to “any rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties” in Article 31.3(c) would include the WTO Agreement.  
On some occasions, NAFTA panels have referred to WTO law and case law in support of their 
decisions. For instance, in Broomcorn–Brooms, a NAFTA panel relied on the interpretations of certain 
terms used in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards (“domestic industry” and “like or directly 
competitive products”) to interpret NAFTA provisions.121 In Cross-Border Trucking Services, a 
NAFTA panel acknowledged the importance of WTO jurisprudence developed under Article XX of 
GATT when interpreting the term “necessary”.122 It is also interesting to note that WTO case law has 
been referred to not only by panels under the NAFTA State-to-State dispute settlement mechanism and 
the Binational panels on anti-dumping and countervailing measures, but also by arbitrators under the 
NAFTA Investor-State mechanism.
123
 Some have argued, however, that WTO law and case law in 
investment disputes has been sometimes considered without taking into account the particular PTA 
context and the different nature of the interests at stake in investment disputes (investors' vs. state's).
124
 
At the same time, the fragmentation of investment rules and rulings has been flagged as a problem by 
several commentators and states. In any case, the use of WTO law and case law for the interpretation 
of PTA provisions should be considered taking into account the particular context of the PTA, the 
provisions under interpretation, and the matter at issue. The preferential forum could considerably gain 
by taking into consideration WTO case law, as adopted by the DSB, where relevant for the 
interpretation of PTA provisions.  
Where PTAs use WTO rules or similar rules as a basis, it would be necessary to look at or consider 
the corresponding WTO rules. It has been stated that, even in those cases where preferential provisions 
are largely independent from WTO obligations (such as WTO plus provisions), WTO law may have 
an influence since many of the underlying legal concepts are imported from the WTO, for example 
when interpreting the meaning of a preferential market access concession for goods or services or 
terms contained in the government procurement section or chapter.
125
 In Canada-Agricultural 
Products, a NAFTA panel took into consideration GATT provisions that were incorporated into the 
treaty, but amended after the conclusion of the WTO Agreement.
126
 The NAFTA panel recognized the 
amended GATT provision on the basis of a NAFTA clause providing that the parties retain their rights 
and obligations under GATT 1947. The Panel concluded that the reference at issue was not simply to 
the GATT as it existed when the NAFTA provision came into effect (old GATT 1947), but to the 
GATT regime as it had evolved into the WTO. Some PTAs have provisions similar to the one 
included in the NAFTA concerning the modification of WTO provisions incorporated by reference 
into PTAs.  
Likewise, PTA adjudicating bodies shall take into consideration WTO decisions adopted by the 
Membership. The range of WTO decisions adopted for the application or clarification of WTO 
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provisions may be wide (for example, some constitute binding decisions, while others non-binding 
guidelines) and they can be used as valuable tools of interpretation when clarifying PTA provisions, 
depending on the case. As mentioned above, a number of PTAs refer to the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and recognize its importance.
127
 Even in those cases where PTAs 
make no explicit reference to such Declaration, it shall be taken into account where relevant for the 
interpretation of the preferential parties’ rights and obligations as contained in the PTA. The same 
reasoning would apply regarding other decisions aimed at implementing WTO rules. In US– Clove 
Cigarettes, the Appellate Body concluded that a paragraph of the Doha Ministerial Decision 
(paragraph 5.2 on the interpretation of the term “reasonable interval” in Article 2.12 of the 
TBT Agreement) can be considered to be a “subsequent agreement”, within the meaning of Article 31 
(3) (a) of the Vienna Convention – any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.
128
 The relevance and weight given to the 
WTO decisions for purposes of interpretation would depend on the specific provisions at issue, their 
context, and the particular aspects of the dispute. Thus, a case could be made in favor of requesting 
PTA panels to take into account decisions adopted by the Members regarding the application, 
interpretation, or clarification of WTO rules, where relevant, for purposes of interpreting PTA 
provisions as a means of promoting coherence between the two regimes. 
IV. Conclusions 
The proliferation of PTAs leads to an increasing fragmentation of both substantial and procedural 
governance of trade, putting at risk the coherent application of global trade rules. The need for a 
coherent application of trade rules emanating from different legal orders requires employment of the 
legal techniques available under public international law. Systemic integration of both PTA- and 
WTO-based rules poses a two-sided challenge: How to integrate PTA rules into the application of 
WTO rules, and vice-versa?  
The principle of systemic integration embodied in Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention can 
play a key role in promoting coherence in disputes involving the preferential parties. GATT/WTO 
panels have already resorted to bilateral agreements to the extent that this has been relevant to 
determine the obligations of disputing parties. PTA rules may be further relevant to define the scope of 
certain terms (e.g., open-ended terms) contained in the WTO Agreement and for determining the 
relationship between preferential and multilateral rules. The issue of how, when, and to what extent 
PTAs should be taken into account has to be decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on the 
context and particular circumstances of each dispute. In this regard, the following elements could be 
taken into consideration when systemically integrating multilateral and preferential rules: (i) the 
"relevance" of the PTA provision at issue; that is, whether it concerns the same subject matter as the 
WTO provision under interpretation, or as bearing upon the interpretation of the WTO provision at 
issue; (ii) whether the PTA provision serves to establish the common intention of the parties; and, (iii) 
the extent to which the PTA clearly defines the relationship between multilateral and preferential 
rules. The possibility of different interpretations will have to be weighed against the gains derived 
from considering WTO rules within their normative environment and promoting coherence between 
PTAs and the WTO. As the Appellate Body noted in EC and Certain Member States - Large Civil 
Aircraft, it is necessary to strike a balance between “taking due account of an individual Member's 
international obligations” and ensuring a “harmonious interpretation of WTO law”.129 The use of 
PTAs as a means of interpretation of WTO law may become more manifest as more WTO Members 
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from different regions, legal traditions, and at different levels of development conclude plurilateral 
PTAs.  
In parallel, PTA panels shall consider WTO law when interpreting PTA provisions, including the 
decisions adopted by the WTO Members on the application and interpretation of the WTO 
agreements. In many cases, it will be necessary to consider WTO rules, as PTAs generally use WTO 
rules as a basis to add new commitments. WTO judicial interpretations, as adopted by the DSB, could 
also provide valuable guidance to PTA panels as well as in offering adaptability to the evolving global 
trading environment. This would make it possible to build on well-established case law and the 
experience of WTO panels and the Appellate Body on the interpretation of rules and terms which are 
also contained in PTAs. In addition, the inclusion of clear and specific PTA provisions ruling on the 
relationship between multilateral and preferential rules should be considered in order to provide 
precise guidance to adjudicators and smooth the application of systemic integration at both levels.  
The readiness of WTO panels to integrate PTA rules may also strengthen the trajectory of 
international trade law. A narrow understanding requiring all WTO Members to be bound by the rules 
may isolate WTO adjudication in the long run. It would also establish a two-tier system within 
international trade law which is at odds with public international law and would ignore the potential 
value of PTAs to clarify WTO rules. Relying on the principle of systemic integration in Article 31.3(c) 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties would provide a legal basis for considering PTA 
rules in WTO disputes, thereby enhancing the predictability of the global trading environment. 
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